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THE FAILURE OF THE RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT UNDER
SECTION 5 OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT
WILLIAM W. VAN ALSTYNEt
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitu-
tion, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.'
The generalities of the Fourteenth Amendment are so indetermi-
nate as to what state actions are forbidden that this Court has
found it a ready instrument, in one field or another, to magnify
federal, and incidentally its own, authority over the states....
There is no doubt that if there were a super-Supreme Court, a
substantial proportion of our [decisions respecting what the states
may or may not do consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment]
would also be reversed. We are not final because we are infalli-
ble, but we are infallible only because we are final.2
[T]his act reverses the Supreme Court's decision Employment
Division against Smith...
t William R. Perkins Professor of Law, Duke University (with appreciation to
Erika King for research and editorial assistance).
1. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
2. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 534, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring); see also
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the province
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.").
3. President's Remarks on Signing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993,
2 PUB. PAPERs 2000 (Nov. 16, 1993). The text of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994), is reprinted infra as an Appendix.
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A.
Suppose at the outset of a state criminal homicide prosecu-
tion, the defendant moves to exclude incriminating evidence4 the
police had found in an open field on his property, just inside the
fence. In moving to suppress, the defendant relies on the Fourth
Amendment5 as applied to the states via the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.6 He submits that, because the
police entered the field without a search warrant, the "fruits of the
search," i.e., the gun, must be suppressed. The State demurs on
the ground that no warrant was required to search the field-the
defendant is simply mistaken in suggesting otherwise.7 The state
court, however, accepts the defendant's view that the Supreme
Court case supporting the State's position has been called into
serious question.8 Admitting the issue is uncertain, the state court
nonetheless rules in the defendant's favor. It therefore grants the
motion to suppress.
Following ineffective interlocutory appeal by the State through
the state courts, the case then arrives, via petition of the State, at
the United States Supreme Court, to review the critical state court
ruling on the Fourth Amendment question. The Supreme Court
reverses in an opinion by the Chief Justice (seven justices concur-
4. Such evidence might be, for example, the discarded gun used to kill the victim
(as confirmed in ballistic tests), which is registered to the defendant and bears powder
traces exactly matching traces found on the defendant's hand.
5. The Fourth Amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma-
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
6. For the proposition that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause makes
applicable to the states the Fourth Amendment provisions regarding searches and sei-
zures, the defendant rightly relies on Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963), and Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
7. The State notes that the Fourth Amendment does not extend to open fields,
whether fenced or not, citing Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924) (Holmes, J.)
("[T]he special protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the people in their
'persons, houses, papers, and effects,' is not extended to the open fields.").
8. Most notably, perhaps, by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (hold-
ing that the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement does extend to surreptitious wire-
tapping of ordinary pay phones, and declaring that the Fourth Amendment protects peo-
ple, not places).
[Vol. 46:291
FAILURE OF THE RFRA
ring, one dissenting) and remands the case for trial. It holds that
no warrant was required.' The Court sums up:
A state court does not deprive a person of liberty "without due
process" merely by admitting evidence against him which was
found by police in the course of an open field search. The State
commits no constitutional wrong under the Fourth Amendment
in having acquired evidence in this manner, for we hold the
Fourth Amendment is inapplicable in these circumstances. So,
too, the State commits no constitutional wrong under the Four-
teenth Amendment, which merely applies the Fourth Amendment
equally to the states. Accordingly, the state law (here, its law of
criminal procedure) governing the admissibility of such evidence
does not as applied infringe any due process right of the accused.
The decision below is reversed, the judgment vacated, and the
case remanded for trial.
Against the background of this clear holding from the Court,
we now turn to an act of Congress that presumes to dictate the
opposite outcome-i.e., an act directing the exclusion of the in-
criminating evidence in the remanded state court proceedings, 10
despite the State's successful appeal to the Supreme Court.
Enacted the year following the Supreme Court's decision, the
act reflects Congress' disapproval of any state that would presume
to take seriously-much less in any way rely on-the view of the
Supreme Court (rather than the dissent) as a "correct" statement
of "the law." Congress first expresses its disdain for the Supreme
Court's opinion and, having done so, moves to enact the dissent,
recast in the following words:
No court of any state shall admit as evidence in any civil or
criminal proceeding anything taken from any field owned by one
who has not consented to its search, absent a warrant issued by a
neutral magistrate on a finding of probable cause.
The obvious question promptly presents itself. For at once the
State wants to know on what basis Congress presumes to com-
mand its courts and dictate its rules of evidence in this way."
9. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 176-77 (1984) (reaffirming the holding
in Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924), and declining to confer Fourth Amend-
ment sanctuary on open fields remote from houses).
10. And the consequent release of the person charged with homicide (because of the
compelled suppression of the most critical evidence tending to establish his guilt).
11. The question raised by the State concerns the entitlement of Congress to set
1996]
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Note that the state presenting this question is not interested in
whether Congress might prescribe such a rule merely to govern
the admissibility of evidence in the federal courts. 2 It readily rec-
ognizes that pursuant to provisions in Article III of the Constitu-
tion and the Necessary and Proper Clause in Article I, Congress
aside the Supreme Court's authoritative adjudication of the Due Process Clause, and to
mandate that, instead, all state courts (and presumably then all federal courts examining
the state court conviction on collateral attack) shall treat the case just reviewed as
though it involved a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, though none of these
courts would otherwise so conclude. The State, in raising this question, does nothing at
all remarkable. The Supreme Court readily recognizes the legitimacy of the inquiry. See
Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 89 (1907) ("[T]he proposition that there are legislative
powers . . . not expressed in the grant of powers [to Congress], is in direct conflict with
the doctrine that this is a government of enumerated powers."); United States v. Fisher,
6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 395 (1805) ("[U]nder a constitution conferring specific powers, the
power contended for must be granted, or it cannot be exercised."); 2 ELLIOTT'S DE-
BATES 489 (2d ed. 1836) (comments of James Wilson regarding Pennsylvania's adoption
of the Constitution) ("If a law should be made inconsistent with those powers vested by
this instrument in Congress, the judges, as a consequence of their independence, and the
particular powers of government being defined, will declare such law to be null and
void .. ").
12. Similarly, to the extent the RFRA itself merely prescribes a rule of construction
regarding the manner in which other acts of Congress are to be applied, it is unre-
markable. It is simply of no consequence why Congress prescribes a rule specifying how
its own statutes are to be applied. Specifically, whether Congress so provided merely
from political desire to ingratiate itself (or its incumbent members) with various religious
organizations, for example, or even from a view that the spirit of the First Amendment
is somehow best served by exempting one class of citizens from laws that all others must
obey, is not a critical or even relevant issue for the courts. For the courts, rather, it is
quite enough that Congress has the power to enact such a provision (which it doubtless
does) and that, as enacted--solely to declare how federal statutes are to be affected-the
RFRA does not so favor religion as to run afoul of the Establishment Clause (or the
implied Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment). See EEOC v. Catholic Univ.
of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 470 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (dicta sustaining the RFRA merely as a direc-
tive by Congress regarding the manner in which acts of Congress shall be applied, find-
ing this within congressional authority under the Constitution).
For suggestions that such purely religious exemptions from laws binding on all
others are not easily reconcilable with the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment
and the implied Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment, see Welsh v. United
States, 398 U.S. 333, 344-67 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring), Walz v. Tax Commission, 397
U.S. 664, 694-700 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring), and Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,
418-23 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting). A majority of the Court, however, treats them as
permissible, albeit within certain limits. Compare Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison,
432 U.S. 63, 72, 81, 85 (1977) (holding that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, by
calling for reasonable rather than absolute accommodation and extending that require-
ment to all religious beliefs and practices rather than protecting only Sabbath observance,
is an anti-discrimination law rather than an endorsement of religion and therefore is valid
under the Establishment Clause), with Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703,
710-11 (1985) (striking, on Establishment Clause grounds, a Connecticut statute that pro-
vided Sabbath observers with an absolute right not to work on their Sabbath).
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may prescribe such rules of evidence, generally, as it thinks appro-
priate. 3 All concede, however, that Congress is given no such
power in respect to the states, their rules of evidence, or their
courts. 4
After conceding this general point when the case is on re-
mand to the trial court, counsel for the defendant says the follow-
ing:
The answer to that question is ... that the power to adopt this
act requiring this court to exclude the evidence in question...
well, it comes from the last section of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment itself. And insofar as Congress is given this kind of power
pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and has ex-
ercised it to prevent this court from considering this evidence, its
act forbidding consideration of this evidence is necessarily enti-
tled to control in the state courts pursuant to the Supremacy
Clause in Article VI.
Well, we quite agree with defense counsel as to the Suprem-
acy Clause in Article VI. But, of course, that clause is not the
source of Congress' power to have adopted this (or any other)
act.' As to that, we must look to the other part of the answer
provided. Puzzled by counsel's response, but interested to see
whether he could possibly be correct, we turn to the section of the
Constitution that he has invoked for the act of Congress, and we
read it. This is what Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment says:
13. See Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 353 n.11 (1959) ("Congress has the
power to prescribe rules of procedure for the federal courts, and has from the earliest
days exercised that power.... The power of this Court to prescribe rules of procedure
and evidence for the federal courts exists only in the absence of a relevant Act of Con-
gress."). And whether Congress puts the explanation for its rules of evidence on the
ground of mere policy preference rather than anything more profound (such as a belief
that they-or some of them-are constitutionally required) is, for the courts, really nei-
ther here nor there. There are, of course, limits to Congress' power to prescribe proce-
dures and rules of evidence, see, eg., United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146
(1872), but none would be implicated by a rule of the sort here.
14. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 162 (1992) ("[T]he Consti-
tution has never been understood to confer upon Congress the ability to require the
States to govern according to Congress' instructions.").
15. Rather, Article VI merely provides: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof ... shall be the supreme Law of
the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Con-
stitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." (emphasis added).
1996]
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The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article. 6
And the question immediately prompts itself: What "provision," if
any, of "this article," does this act of Congress merely "en-
force"?7
It may be the case-indeed, it probably is the case-that the
clause commits to Congress the authority to provide for the pun-
ishment of local law enforcement personnel who conduct unlawful
searches and seizures (i.e., those pursued in disregard of Fourth
Amendment restrictions applicable to the states by force of Sec-
tion 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment). Such a law, were it adopt-
ed by Congress, might well forcefully illustrate what it means to
say (as Section 5 does say) that Congress shall have power to
"enforce" (i.e., compel observance of) that which the Fourteenth
Amendment enjoins." And, in order to further deter unlawful
searches and seizures, possibly Congress could, by statute, forbid
the state's use of evidence wrongly obtained by the police (i.e.,
obtained by means that the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments
disallow).
Here, however, Congress has done neither of these things, nor
anything even faintly like them. Rather, Congress has claimed no
less than an authority to review the Supreme Court for constitu-
tional error. This is the power Congress now claims:
Whether or not the Supreme Court is of the view that the
Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid open field searches ab-
sent consent of the owner or a warrant issued by a neutral mag-
istrate on a showing of probable cause, we think (or at least we
are prepared to declare) that it would be a better interpretation
of the Fourteenth Amendment if it did. And we shall treat the
16. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
17. That is, what provision does the act merely compel the state scrupulously to
respect (or hold the state accountable for failing to respect)? The standard dictionary def-
inition of "enforce" is merely "[t]o compel observance of or obedience to." AMERICAN
HERITAGE DICInONARY 610 (3d ed. 1992). The same term, "enforce," appears in match-
ing clauses of several other amendments as well. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIII, § 2; U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 2; U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2; U.S. CONST. amend. XVI, § 2;
U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, § 2, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI; U.S. CONST.
amend. XIX; U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII, § 2.
18. Indeed, there is a federal statute that does authorize the federal prosecution of
state or local police in these circumstances-and, to be sure, it was adopted by Congress
pursuant to Section 5. See 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1994).
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Fourteenth Amendment, therefore, as if it did. In our view, that
is a far better proposition than that which the opinion of the
Supreme Court happens to reflect. We think ourselves as much
entitled to measure the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment's
coverage as are the members of the Supreme Court and, insofar
as we deem it appropriate, by suitable legislation adopted for the
purpose, we may render the Supreme Court's opinion altogether
moot.
Moreover, there is a significant advantage to our under-
standing of the power vested in us by Section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment. For it is only through our understanding that
we can gain a rightful authority to override a much larger num-
ber of state laws, and further magnify federal authority over the
states, as well as to override unacceptable decisions by the Su-
preme Court. Thus, our understanding of our superior role vis-td-
vis the Supreme Court, as vested in us pursuant to Section 5, is
this: it enables us to review decisions of the Supreme Court as a
super-Supreme Court and to say wherein the Supreme Court has
erred in sustaining some state law or state practice as one that is
not forbidden by Section 1. When, moreover, a case arises that
draws into question whether a given state practice does or does
not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Court says it
does not, but we say it should nevertheless be deemed to do so,
declaring our superseding and superior power to proceed in this
fashion pursuant to Section 5, courts shall yield to our view and
decide the case accordingly. For if the state statute is in conflict
with our interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment as we have
presumed to declare it by law, the case shall be brought speedily
to an end-decided as this Congress decrees shall be done.19
19. Compare this hypothetical language to strikingly parallel provisions in the RFRA.
In § 2000bb(a)(5), Congress asserts its strong preference for a different First and Four-
teenth Amendment standard--one it deems more suitable "for striking sensible balances
between religious liberty and competing prior governmental interests"--than the Supreme
Court has determined either amendment requires of a state. Compare RFRA
§ 2000bb-l(b) (protecting the free exercise of religion from governmental burden unless
such restriction furthers a "compelling governmental interest" and "is the least restrictive
means of furthering that . . . interest") with Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,
878-79 (1990) (holding that a law whose objective is not to prohibit the free exercise of
religion does not violate the First Amendment, even though the incidental effects of "a
generally applicable and otherwise valid provision" do restrict free exercise). In the sec-
tions that follow, Congress then presumes to prohibit any state law that does not satisfy
the standard it sets out, a standard that "substitutes" for the less restrictive test that the
Court has declared to be, in the Court's view, all that the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments require. See RFRA §§ 2000bb-1, 2000bb-3; see also Sasnett v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d
1018, 1019, 1021 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that "[The RFRA] thus seeks to return the
19961
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Put more succinctly, Congress reads Section 5 to say:
Whatever Congress may declare to be inconsistent with any other
clause in this amendment, any opinion of the Supreme Court or
any other court notwithstanding, Congress may forbid to the
States.
Of course Section 5 does not read this way or anything like it.
Nor is it imaginable that were it recast in this fashion, it could
have emerged from Congress as a serious proposal-whether in
1866 or today-and much less is it imaginable that it would have
been ratified (or would now be ratified) by any state? It is a
courts ... to the approach they had taken before Smith .... The motivation behind the
[RFRA] was in fact disagreement with the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Constitu-
tion." (emphasis added)); Douglas Laycock & Oliver S. Thomas, Interpreting the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, 73 TEx. L. REv. 209, 219 (1994) (declaring that the RFRA "is
designed to restore ... rights that Congress believes should exist if the Constitution
were properly interpreted" (emphasis added), which, of course, Laycock and Thomas
think, in Smith, it was not, and that, to overrule Smith, Congress enacted the RFRA).
The RFRA does not stand on a more modest claim (sometimes made) that it is merely
an appropriate measure to prevent otherwise-difficult-to-prove violations of the First or
Fourteenth Amendment (nor is it limited in any manner of speaking to any such kinds
of cases, whatever one might fancy them to be). Cf. Douglas Laycock, RFRA, Congress,
and the Ratchet, 56 MONT. L. REV. 145, 166 (1995); Flores v. City of Boerne, 73 F.3d
1352, 1359 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 293 (U.S. Oct. 15, 1996) (No.
95-2074). See also infra text accompanying notes 50-62.
20. That such a proposal would not have passed in Congress, let alone have been
ratified by the requisite number of states, is implicit in the rejection of H.R. 63, CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1033 (1866), an early draft of Section 1 introduced in Feb-
ruary of 1866 by Representative Bingham of Ohio. See id. That proposed amendment
itself did not presume to go nearly as far as the approach described above, yet even it
was deemed unacceptable, even in Congress. Bingham's failed draft would merely have
provided that:
The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary and
proper to secure to the citizens of each State all privileges and immunities of
citizens in the several States, and to all persons in the several States equal
protection in the rights of life, liberty, and property.
Id. at 1034.
Two sorts of objections were raised by the opponents of this Congress-empowering
proposal. First, the rights contained therein were not self-executing. Absent Congressional
action, there would be nothing for the courts to apply. In other words, the amendment
would be meaningless, except insofar as Congress provided affirmative legislation (which it
could of course repeal at any time). Second, the proposed amendment at the same time
would commit too much intrusive power to Congress by providing Congress with the
power to oust state legislative jurisdiction to whatever extent it might presume to see fit.
See, eg., id. at 1063-66, 1094 (remarks of Rep. Hale (New York)); id. at 1095 (remarks
of Rep. Hotchkiss (New York)); id. app. at 133-35 (remarks of Rep. Rogers (New Jer-
sey)); cf. CONo. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 115-16 (1872) (remarks of Rep.
Famsworth (Illinois)).
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breathtaking assertion of bootstrap authority, an utter trivialization
of federalism and of the Tenth Amendment.
The Tenth Amendment merely made explicit what was other-
wise understood by the doctrine of enumerated powers-that Con-
gress may make laws overriding state laws, but it may do so only
to the extent it is granted express authority to do so, and not
beyond.2' However, where a state law neither makes nor threat-
ens an interference with any right each person has against a state
under Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment (whether it be a
right to a fair trial or, as here, a right to be free from searches
and seizures not complying with the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment-a matter each state concedes to be ultimately for
the Supreme Court to decide despite its fervent position that the
Court is mistaken), there is nothing in the grant of powers made
to Congress (and assuredly nothing in Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment) authorizing Congress to instruct a state and its courts
to ignore state law and instead to conduct judicial proceedings
merely as Congress thinks more suitable.
Consideration of the proposal was postponed. The provision in H.R. 127, CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2265, 2286 (1866), that was subsequently to become Section
1 of the Fourteenth Amendment took, of course, a different form-Section 1 to be self-
executing ("No state shall .... ") and Section 5 simply allowing enforcement by Con-
gress. See MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE 68-71, 128-29 (1986);
ROBERT J. HARRIS, THE QUEST FOR EQUALITY 34-50 (1960); JOSEPH B. JAMES, THm
FRAMING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 86, 189 (1956); Alexander M. Bickel, The
Voting Rights Cases, 1966 SUP. CT. REv. 79, 97 [hereinafter Bickel, The Voting Rights
Cases]; Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69
HARV. L. REv. 1, 29-56 (1955); Jay S. Bybee, Taking Liberties with the First Amendment
Congress, Section 5, and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 48 VAND. L. REv. 1539,
1578-85, 1589-96, 1598, 1616-24 (1995); Michael P. Zuckert, Congressional Power Under
the Fourteenth Amendment-The Original Understanding of Section 5, 3 CONST. COM-
MENT. 123, 134-44 (1986).
21. Indeed, a broader power in Congress to override state laws was unequivocally
rejected during the Constitutional Convention. Well into the summer of 1787, Madison
championed a proposal that Congress would have a "negative" on state laws. See, e.g.,
Letter from James Madison to George Washington (April 16, 1787), reprinted in II
WRITINGs OF JAMES MADISON 346-49 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910). This national "veto"
power residing in Congress was rejected on July 17, 1787, essentially for being too direct
an interference with the legislative processes and prerogatives of the states. See II THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTIoN OF 1787 27-28 (Max Farrand ed., 1937). The
document that emerged from Philadelphia in September contained no trace of Madison's
proposed congressional veto.
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B.
The case we have just examined is no different than were
Congress alternatively, or additionally, to prescribe by federal law
that "no state shall provide for the trial of any person charged
with a violation of any of its criminal statutes by a jury consisting
of fewer than twelve persons"-though the state law might itself
provide for a jury of, say, six, or eight, rather than twelve. Must
each state now comply with this act of Congress, alter its practice,
accept the additional costs, and empanel only juries conforming to
the congressional demand? There is no basis on which it should
feel so obliged. The reason is exactly the same as in the case we
just examined, namely, no authority is granted to Congress to
demand any such condition as this, and certainly none at all under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Congress may believe that persons accused of various crimes
ought to have all manner of extra, constitutionally unrequired,
protections when subjected to criminal trial in state court-whether
those protections be, for example, a twelve-person jury,2 or rep-
resentation by "no fewer than two counsel" rather than one.' A
state may itself agree as a matter of policy, and may surely choose
to so provide, by statute or in its constitution. But of course it
need not. And, in not agreeing, it may make different provisions
with respect to its criminal trials-with no suggestion that, in so
doing, it in any way acts contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment.
And, indeed, the Supreme Court has expressly assured each
state that this is so, declaring that the "due process of law" does
not require twelve-person juries. Rather, it requires only that no
22. Or perhaps, for that matter, a fourteen-person jury. Note that the theory pursuant
to which Congress claims power to "enforce" the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause is that Section 5 provides Congress not merely ample authority to ensure that
every state meets its due process obligations (clearly the point of giving power to Con-
gress, in Section 5, to "enforce" the article "by appropriate legislation")-but also author-
ity to require the states to go beyond any and all measures deemed sufficient by the
Supreme Court to bring the state into full compliance with the Due Process Clause. And
if that is so, it seems merely to be a matter of congressional determination to say "how
much more" the state must do. For example, if twelve is "better" due process than six,
surely fourteen may be even "better" due process than twelve?
23. And, again, it may be able so to provide with respect to all federal criminal
trials. With respect to prescribing the conditions of such purely federal trials, Congress is
not limited merely to providing that they be conducted in a manner not inconsistent with
the constitutional guarantees of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments. See supra text
accompanying notes 12-13.
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state criminal trial jury shall consist of fewer than six jurors.24 An
act of Congress mandating that each state must nevertheless em-
panel larger juries to conduct felony trials-juries of no fewer than
twelve persons--cannot be said to be legislation "authorized" by
Section 5, for such legislation "enforces" nothing required by any
clause in the Fourteenth Amendment according to the Supreme
Court.
What, then, does this act do? It overreaches congressional
authority by presuming to mandate a policy which Congress might
wish each state to adopt, but which each state obviously need not
adopt in order to be in full compliance with the Fourteenth
Amendment. It is, at best, a proposal-one that Congress may
very well encourage,' but one that it has no constitutional basis
24. See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 239 (1978).
25. By way of contrast, an act so doing-that is, an act of Congress actually (and
merely) "enforcing" the Fourteenth Amendment due process right to trial by a jury of
no fewer than six persons-would be an act that provided a secure means of overturning
any conviction obtained with a jury of fewer than that minimum number. And, to be
sure, there is such an act. See, eg., 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (1994) (federal habeas avail-
able in just this way). It might also be an act that provided for civil damages against the
offending state personnel, or even against the state as such. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983,
1985, 1986 (1994). Nor would the Eleventh Amendment bar Congress from providing that
remedy directly against the state in federal court. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445,
456 (1976). It might be an act that imposed federal criminal sanctions against state offi-
cials who knowingly denied this Fourteenth Amendment right to an accused. See, e.g., 18
U.S.C. §§ 241, 242 (1994) (criminal sanctions applicable in such a case); Ex parte Virgin-
ia, 100 U.S. 339, 344-49 (1879) (sustaining federal prosecution of state judge for exclud-
ing black citizens from petit and grand jury service). It could even include an act that
provided for the immediate removal into federal court of any case wherein the accused
would be unable to "enforce" that right. See eg., Strander v. West Virginia, 100 U.S.
303, 311-12 (1879). The point of these examples is that Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment does, indeed, grant to Congress considerable authority to secure to each
person every right the Supreme Court agrees is furnished by Section 1. Indeed, it autho-
rizes Congress to put federal armed forces at the disposal of the President to assure that
federal court orders respecting the enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment as de-
clared by the Supreme Court shall not be obstructed or ignored by state governments-it
authorizes enforcement with very real "teeth." See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 12
(1958) (mentioning, in a case upholding a federal court desegregation order, the
President's use of federal troops to enforce that order (implicitly approved by Congress)).
26. To be sure, Congress may provide such "encouragement" by qualifying the avail-
ability of federal funds to assist states in the costs of operating their systems for adminis-
tering justice-i.e., it might restrict eligibility for such assistance to states that provide for
twelve-person juries. See Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990) (upholding the
Equal Access Act, which prohibits public secondary schools receiving federal financial
assistance from denying student organizations equal access to school facilities on the basis
of the content, including religious content, of their speech). We do not pause to examine
that possible use of the spending power "with strings attached." No such law or proposal
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to mandate.
The provisions of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA)27 stand on exactly the same empty ground and are utter-
ly indistinguishable. They are no different from the two examples
we have now examined, or endless others we might just as easily
propose. Perhaps it will be useful to provide just one more illus-
tration, nonetheless, simply to make the point very clear.
C.
We turn, then, to a third example. Imagine a Congress, a
"liberal" Congress-one much more tolerant of, or even supportive
of, sexually explicit speech (including "obscenity") than the First
Amendment requires it to be.' If it wishes to embrace such a
more tolerant policy, Congress may surely do so-it may assuredly
relax or repeal such federal statutes (such as those governing the
U.S. Post Office) as may currently restrict obscenity.29 Yet, al-
though one readily concedes that this is so, nothing gives Congress
any similar prerogative with respect to state and local laws-laws
that are not of its creation and thus not similarly subject to its
legislative preferences. It has no power, for example, to set aside a
carefully and narrowly drawn anti-obscenity ordinance in Los An-
geles, which ordinance meets every test the Supreme Court has
repeatedly declared to be sufficient under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments."0 Least of all could Congress presume to do so on
the strength of any power confided to it by Section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment (for example, by providing that no state law or
is before us, nor is the RFRA such a law.
27. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994). See Appendix for the full text of the statute.
28. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) ("We hold that obscenity is
not within the area of constitutionally protected speech .... ").
29. Note that in so doing, however, Congress would not be exercising a power to
"enforce" the First Amendment. No such power is given to Congress; the First Amend-
ment is not an empowering clause; it is a disabling clause (i.e., it disables Congress). Nor
does the Necessary and Proper Clause apply, for that clause merely equips Congress to
enact legislation suitable, in its view, to "carry into execution" such "powers" as are
otherwise vested in it-and the First Amendment vests none in it (or in anyone else).
For insightful discussions of this point, see Bybee, supra note 20, at 1555-57, and William
T. Mayton, "Buying-Up Speech". Active Government and the Terms of the First and Four-
teenth Amendments, 3 WM. & MARY BILL OF RIHS J. 373, 386-405 (1994). Rather, in
the example just provided, Congress would merely be exercising its discretion under the
Post Office Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7.
30. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23-34 (1973) (discussing the First and Four-
teenth Amendment constraints on state and local anti-obscenity laws).
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local ordinance presuming to regulate or restrict obscene material
shall be deemed to be valid in any court).
To be sure, Congress need not be impressed with the Court's
interpretations of the First Amendment,3 and so need not "con-
form" to them in its own legislation-it may permit freer circula-
tion of obscene materials, as far as its own statutes are concerned,
than the Supreme Court says it must allow.32 But it can scarcely
claim to be "enforcing" any provision in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment when it seeks to insulate local purveyors of obscene material
from answering to constitutionally valid and unexceptional state and
local laws fully sustained in the Supreme Court. Insofar as those
state and local laws are consistent with the First and Fourteenth
Amendments, the states owe no one an apology for enacting and
fairly enforcing them. Nor is there any authority in Congress to
forbid the states to do so, under pretense of "enforcing" the Four-
teenth Amendment itself.33
31. For example, it may feel that the Court's interpretations are "too narrow," or
"too rigid," or "insufficiently appreciative of the value of free speech."
32. For a useful review of such matters, see Paul Brest, Congress as Constitutional
Decisionmaker and Its Power to Counter Judicial Doctrine, 21 GA. L. RnV. 57, 61-68
(1986).
33. To override state laws forbidding the sale or possession of obscene materials the
Court holds unprotected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, Congress would need
to rely on some other power than that vested by Section 5. For example, it might rely
on the power to "regulate commerce ... among the several states," as vested in Con-
gress in Article I, pursuant to which it may protect trade in such publications it prefers
to be freely circulated in the United States without interference by state laws. The
RFRA makes no claim under the Commerce Clause, nor, given its reach-it presumes to
reach literally every state law or practice--could it do so with any hope of being sus-
tained. Cf. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1634 (1995) (holding that the Com-
merce Clause, although broad, is not so expansive to convert Congressional authority to
a general police power of the sort retained by the states).
For a twice-useful comparison in this very regard, compare the Privacy Protection
Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa-6(f) (1994), with the RFRA. Just like the RFRA, the
Privacy Protection Act was a congressional response to a Supreme Court decision,
Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978). See S. REP. No. 96-874, at 4 (1980),
reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3950. It effectively displaces the decision, requiring the
use of less intrusive subpoenas (rather than more physically intrusive search warrants) by
police when material is sought of newspapers or other publishers, subject to certain ex-
ceptions (e.g., when "there is reason to believe ... immediate seizure ... is necessary
to prevent . . . destruction" of the material). 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa(b)(1)-(3). In contrast
with the RFRA, however, the Privacy Protection Act is expressly tied to the Commerce
Clause-specifically, it is solely applicable to work in preparation for newspapers, book
publishers, and broadcast companies "in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce." Id.
§ 2000aa(a), (b) (emphasis added). The RFRA makes no such pretense, of course, and
also has no such limiting provision; again, it applies to every state law, whatever its sub-
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The same is equally true when we turn, finally, to the Reli-
gious Freedom Restoration Act.34 A state, the Supreme Court has
said (in Employment Division v . Smith), may excuse those who
ingest various drugs incidental to some religious practice,35 but it
is without constitutional obligation to make such an exception.36
This is equally true of Congress. Nothing in the First or Four-
teenth Amendments compels the state (or Congress) to grant such
an exception. In this respect, moreover, a state's neutral treatment
of criminal drug use stands on the same permissible constitutional
footing as its resolve to disallow obscene materials to be freely
bought and sold,37 its use of six-person (rather than twelve-per-
son) juries," or its policy to permit police searches of open fields.
Whether a neighboring state, or the federal government, has a dif-
ferent policy on one or more of these matters-as each assuredly
may39 -is for each to settle in respect to laws under its own re-
ject, whether or not connected to some kind of commerce. Whether the Privacy Protec-
tion Act is constitutional may depend on one's view of United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct.
1624 (1995), but nothing more. It makes no claim of a supererogatory power in Congress
of the sort asserted in the RFRA.
34. The Appendix to this Essay contains the full text of the RFRA.
35. The state may make such exception, that is, despite the Establishment Clause.
And, in fact, immediately subsequent to the Court's decision in Smith, the Oregon legis-
lature reconsidered and enacted just such an exception. See Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
475.992(5) (Supp. 1996) (providing an affirmative defense for possession of peyote "used
or . . .intended for use ...[i]n connection with the good faith practice of a religious
belief").
36. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
37. It is just as clear that under Smith a state need not exempt religious vendors of
criminally obscene materials from its criminal obscenity laws. (Though it may, if somehow
so inclined.) See id.
38. Nor, under Smith, would the state need to empanel a jury of more than six
merely to "accommodate" a defendant who adheres, in good faith, to a religion forbid-
ding him, under pain of everlasting damnation, to be tried by a jury of fewer than
twelve jurors. By way of contrast, under the RFRA this evidently would-or certainly
might-be required of the state (since it would be easy enough, on such occasions, to
empanel a jury of twelve and avoid a "substantial burden" on the accused). Our position
here is the same as elsewhere, namely: if Congress, in its peculiar wisdom, wishes to
provide for highly "religion-specific accommodations" in federal trials, perhaps it may do
so as a matter of policy (despite what should strike many as an inappropriate form of
religion-favoring inconsistent with the Establishment Clause). But, however that may be,
Congress has no equivalent authority to impose such a policy on any state-not pursuant
to anything in Article I, nor anything in Article III, nor anything in Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment itself.
39. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous
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spective authority, on such policy terms as it deems best for it-
self.4° They have command of their own policies, nothing more 4
Congress, of course, does nothing wrong when it merely en-
acts legislation which it believes, in good faith, to be appropriate
to enforce the constitutional obligations of each state as set out in
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Frequently Congress may
have no choice other than to move ahead with legislation-matters
may seem to call for positive measures of enforcement in a time
or in a setting where there remains genuine uncertainty concerning
the scope of the obligations imposed by Section 1. No one con-
tends that Congress must somehow "wait" for the Supreme Court's
determination of the issue. Nevertheless, whenever Congress so
conducts itself, it is necessarily for the Court eventually to say,
once that Congressional assertion respecting each state's obligation
has been challenged (as eventually it may be), whether Congress
has got the matter right, or got it quite wrong.42 And here, unless
State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.").
40. Indeed, a state may well have provisions in its own constitution that are substan-
tially more restrictive of state action than anything compelled by Congress or by the U.S.
Constitution. Compare, e.g., State v. Scott, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 1337-38 (N.Y. 1992) (finding
that Article I, Section 12 of the New York Constitution protects private lands, clearly
fenced and posted against trespassers, from searches), with Oliver v. United States, 466
U.S. 170, 184 (1984) (finding that neither the Fourth nor Fourteenth Amendment man-
dates this treatment by New York). See also California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 43
(1988) ("Individual States may surely construe their own constitutions as imposing more
stringent constraints on police conduct than does the Federal Constitution."); William W.
Van Alstyne, "Thirty Pieces of Silver" For the Rights of Your People: Irresistible Offers
Reconsidered as a Matter of State Constitutional Law, 16 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 303,
304-05 (1993) (citing cases and state constitutional provisions securing other rights).
41. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 162 (1992), which states that "the
Constitution has never been understood to confer upon Congress the ability to require
the Stateg to govern according to Congress' instructions." Nothing in the Fourteenth
Amendment takes any exception to this dictum. Section 5 empowers Congress to secure
scrupulous compliance with the limitations on the states imposed by Section 1, including
preventive and remedial legislation, but nothing more (i.e., it does not empower Congress
to require the States to govern according to Congress' direction, as the RFRA com-
mands).
42. It is as much the case here, as it was in Marbury v. Madison, that: "The powers
of the legislature are defined and limited .... To what purpose are powers limited, and
to what purpose is that limitation committed to writing, if these limits may, at any time,
be passed by those intended to be restrained?" 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803), ap-
plied in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 118, 124-31 (1970) (striking federal statute that
viewed as a violation of equal protection state laws not permitting 18-year-olds to vote in
state elections); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883) (invalidating act of Congress
that presumed to reach acts through Section 5 that the Court held not reached by Sec-
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the Court is itself willing already to concede error in its own deci-
sion in Employment Division v. Smith,43 it must hold that Con-
gress has gotten the matter quite wrong in fact.
Indeed, unless the Court is prepared to abandon Smith, the
case is not even close. The Court has declared that the Fourteenth
Amendment steers a fine course between the Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses-that is, it permits, but does not require, a
state to provide religion-favoring exemptions from the burden of
compliance with its general laws. Nevertheless, Congress insists
quite plainly that a state must do so. Here we do not have a situa-
tion where Congress is excused by any original uncertainty. Con-
gress did not lack for any guiding decision from the Court. Rather,
it knew the Court's decision. It simply did not like that decision,
and, not liking it, moved quite literally to substitute as "law" the
view of the dissent in the case. Even those justices who dissented
in Smith should be reluctant to accept this view of congressional
power under Section 5-power to approve what a dissent may say
(as to the proper reach of the Fourteenth Amendment) and, by
congressional fiat, in the mere verbal cellophane of Section 5,
elevate it by congressional anointment as the law of the land.
tion 1). For recent decisions of the Supreme Court confirming its continuing commitment
to take constitutional federalism seriously whenever suitably raised, see Seminole Tribe v.
Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1119 (1996) (holding that "notwithstanding Congress' clear intent
to abrogate the States' sovereign immunity, the Indian Commerce Clause does not grant
Congress that power"), United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1626 (1995) (holding that
the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 exceeded Congress' authority to regulate inter-
state commerce), and New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992) (holding that
"while Congress has substantial power under the Constitution to encourage the States to
provide for the disposal of the radioactive waste generated within their borders, the Con-
stitution does not confer upon Congress the ability simply to compel the States to do
SO").
43. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). The possibility is a substantial one. The decision was five-to-
four, and Justice Souter has since disclaimed any willingness to invest Smith with any
courtesy of stare decisis, see Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
559 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring). Ironically, however, the effrontery of the RFRA
should make the prospect of such an overruling less, rather than more, likely. For the
Court to overrule Smith in these circumstances would itself suggest a form of judicial
truckling to Congress wholly unworthy of the Court. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 845-46 (1992) (declining the government's invitation to overrule Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), out of concern for "principles of institutional integrity and
the rule of stare decisis").
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II.
A.
The flaw in the RFRA is not so simple as "Congress has
instructed the Supreme Court how to interpret the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment." 44 Congress has not done this;
the Act's defenders are quite correct on this point,4' and the Act
cannot be faulted on this particular ground.46 This is so, however,
44. Hamilton v. Schriro, 74 F.3d 1545, 1566 (8th Cir.) (McMillian, J., dissenting), cert
denied, 117 S. CL 193 (1996); see also In re Young, 82 F.3d 1407, 1421 n.1 (8th Cir.
1996) (Bogue, J., dissenting) ("Having reviewed and studied [Judge McMillian's] thorough
opinion in Hamilton, I am inclined to agree with his position."), petition for cert. filed, 65
U.S.L.W. 3205 (U.S. Sept. 19, 1996) (No. 96-437); State v. Miller, 538 N.W.2d 573, 579
(Wis. Ct. App. 1995) (Sundby, J., dissenting) ("I do not accept that Congress may com-
pel the United States Supreme Court to interpret the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment as Congress believes it should be interpreted."), aff'd, 549 N.W.2d 235 (Wis.
1996); cf Eugene Gressman & Angela C. Carmella, The RFRA Revision of the Free
Exercise Clause, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 65, 121 (1996) ("[The] RFRA is a congressional arrow
aimed directly at the heart of the independent judicial function of constitutional interpre-
tation."); Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Why The Religious Freedom
Restoration Act is Unconstitutional, 69 N.Y.U. L. Rnv. 437, 469, 473 (1994) ("Common
sense suggests that [the] RFRA is a congressional effort to overrule the Supreme Court
on a point of constitutional interpretation.... That is what RFRA's supporters wanted,
and that is what they got.").
45. See, eg., Bonnie I. Robin-Vergeer, Disposing of the Red Herrings: A Defense of
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 69 S. CAL. L. RnV. 589, 612-26 (1996) (and see
the sources cited therein).
46. The problem with the RFRA is also not that it somehow unconstitutionally em-
powers the courts "to pass on religious questions," an objection raised recently by Justice
Mosk of the California Supreme Court. See Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n,
913 P.2d 909, 931 (Cal. 1996) (Mosk, J., concurring) (claiming that Congress, by uncon-
stitutionally requiring the judiciary to address religious questions through RFRA, has
violated separation of powers), petition for cert, filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3034 (U.S. July 8,
1996) (No. 96-31) [unrelated to the Supreme Court's decision in Employment Division v.
Smith]; see also In re Tessier, 190 B.R. 396, 406-07 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1995) (alleging
unconstitutionality of the RFRA on grounds that it incorporates a standard for deciding
religious questions that the Court had previously rejected and usurps the judiciary's au-
thority to determine the propriety of its jurisdiction); Joanne C. Brant, Taking the Su-
preme Court at Its Word. The Implications of RFRA and Separation of Powers, 56 MONT.
L. REv. 5, 6 (1995) (arguing that because the Supreme Court has refused to balance
religious liberties against neutral government regulations, Congress cannot override that
decision through ordinary legislation); Scott C. Idleman, The Religious Freedom Resto-
ration Act: Pushing the Limits of Legislative Power, 73 Tnx. L. REV. 247, 273 (1994)
(arguing that after Smith, the RFRA's requirement that the courts inquire into the sub-
stantiality of a burden on free exercise may be, in fact, unconstitutional). A variation of
the argument appears in Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 44, at 445-52 (questioning the
ability of courts to work with consistency or predictability within the entanglements of
the Sherbert-Yoder test Congress requires them to use).
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simply because Congress has not presumed to instruct any court
directly on how to interpret, or judicially apply, anything in the
Constitution. In the RFRA, Congress has not obtusely declared
that:
In every case arising under the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment, the court shall construe that amendment to forbid
any law substantially burdening a religious belief or religiously
motivated act or practice, unless ... [etc.].47
There are such cases, to be sure. That is, there are cases where resolution of the
legal dispute would plunge a court into matters more appropriately deemed internal ec-
clesiastical disputes-matters with respect to which the Court has declared secular authori-
ty may not presume to take sides. See; eg., EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d
455, 466-67 (D.C. Cir. 1996); see also WILLAM W. VAN ALSTYNE, FIRST AMENDMENT
CASES AND MATERiALS 1126-56 (2d ed. 1995) (presenting cases and discussion on the
issue of government neutrality). But the RFRA would not create such a situation. And
Smith was not decided on the basis that requiring a court to decide whether a state law
impinges in some "substantial way" on a person's "religious" practices or beliefs would
per se unconstitutionally entangle that court in deciding essentially religious questions. It
does not. As the Court itself has often enough observed, it is perfectly possible for there
to be a "religion of one"--that is, an individual's wholly personal "religion" which is
nevertheless one's religion, though no ordinary church or religion would recognize it. See,
eg., United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-88 (1994); see also United States v. Seeger,
380 U.S. 163, 185-88 (1965). Accordingly, requiring that a claimant show in what way his
religiously impelled practices-whatever they may be-would be substantially (rather than
insubstantially) burdened by the law in question simply does not per se entangle courts in
unravelling strands of religious doctrine, or in taking sides in ecclesiastical disputes.
While understandable, Justice Mosk's view is nonetheless incorrect and involves a
misreading of the Supreme Court's decision in Smith. Indeed, Mosk's concern cannot be
accurate, since the Smith decision itself permits legislatures to exempt religious persons
from complying with laws of general application-notwithstanding the Establishment
Clause-and holds merely that nothing in the Free Exercise Clause compels legislatures
to do so. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-80, 890. Obviously, however, if a legislature were to
do so, any person claiming the benefit of the statutory exemption would have to demon-
strate his eligibility. In other words, the Smith decision itself contemplates and permits
legislation that would draw the courts into the determination of the bona fides of individ-
ual religious claims.
47. That the RFRA does not operate in this fashion is illustrated by Smith v. Fair
Employment & Housing Commission, 913 P.2d 909 (Cal. 1996), petition for cert. filed, 65
U.S.L.W. 3034 (U.S. July 8, 1996) (No. 96-31). In that case, a religiously anguished land-
lord sought relief from a state anti-discrimination statute exposing her to damages for
refusing to rent to unmarried cohabiting couples. (To do so, according to her good faith
religious beliefs, would impermissibly implicate her in committing a sin-that is, facilitat-
ing their immoral living arrangement.) She presented two distinct federal claims, using 42
U.S.C. § 1983 as the vehicle for both. The first claim was that the statute as applied to
her was invalid under the First Amendment, as applied through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Applying solely the Supreme Court's First Amendment standards as provided in
Smith by Justice Scalia (writing for the Court), the state supreme court rejected her
claim. See id. at 918-21. The issue was deemed easy. The impugned state law was neu-
tral on its face and was of general application, and there was no suggestion that it had
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The RFRA is, rather, closer in its design to the statute at
issue in United States v. Klein. 8 In that 1870 statute, Congress in-
structed the Court as to the legal effect of a presidential par-
don.49 The statute thus breached separation of powers both with
respect to the president's pardon power (i.e., nullifying it) and
with respect to the judicial power (i.e., dictating the legal effect of
a presidential pardon). With the RFRA, the directive is to dictate
the legal effect courts are to give to any party's free exercise
claim--directing the court to give it the legal effect appropriate in
Congress' view (as stipulated in the statute), contrary to the judi-
cial understanding of the Free Exercise Clause."0 The RFRA
been adopted out of any religious animus. Nor was there any additional constitutional
claim entwined with her religious claim. Thus all the criteria of Smith were readily met.
That having been decided, the court then separately examined her claim based on the
different (and more stringent) provisions of the RFRA, pursuant to which it narrowly
concluded that the act was valid as applied. See id. at 921-29.
For another example, see Hamilton v. Schriro, 74 F.3d 1545 (8th Cir.), cert denied,
117 S. Ct. 193 (1996). Here, a Native American state prisoner challenged a prison regula-
tion restricting hair length and the prison's lack of a suitable sweat lodge. Using 42
U.S.C. § 1983, the prisoner alleged a claim under the First Amendment Free Exercise
Clause and a claim under the RFRA. Although the majority denied both claims, the
dissent made it plain that-were he to find the RFRA constitutional-he would permit
the RFRA challenge (but not the Free Exercise challenge) of the hair regulation to
proceed. Id. at 1557 (McMillian, J., dissenting).
Each of these cases is highly instructive in a different way, however, for each also
indicates very well the intended effect of the RFRA. What is that "intended effect"? It is
that while the RFRA does not affect how a court adjudicates the First Amendment
claim, it takes steps to ensure that any such adjudication will no longer matter. Nothing
need turn on it-the very purpose of the Act is to ensure that this will be so, to
marginalize any such determination by the court, and to do so, moreover, to the point of
making it a virtual irrelevancy (in effect, to reduce it to mere trash). Each of the cases
just noted illustrates the point perfectly well, as do the cases cited infra at note 51.
48. 80 U.S. (13 wall.) 128 (1871).
49. Briefly, the problem was this. Congress had provided for the recovery of private
property captured by the United States during the Civil War, provided the claimant
proved that "he [had] never given any aid or comfort to the ... rebellion." Act of
March 12, 1863, ch. 120, § 3, 12 Stat. 820, 820. The Supreme Court had then affirmed
judgments against the United States for such property, based in part on presidential par-
dons. See Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 182-83 (citing as an example United States v.
Padleford, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 531 (1870)). Subsequently, in 1870, Congress dictated that
"any pardon. . . granted by the President ... shall be taken and deemed... conclu-
sive evidence that such person did take part in and give aid and comfort to the...
rebellion." Act of July 12, 1870, ch. 251, 16 Star. 230, 235. This latter statute came be-
fore the Supreme Court in Klein.
50. Judge Smalkin caught the distinction, as well as the connection, between the
RFRA and the statute at issue in Klein in his recent opinion, Keeler v. Mayor of
Cumberland, 928 F. Supp. 591, 604 (D. Md. 1996) (holding the RFRA beyond the power
vested in Congress by Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment). Judge Smalkin stated:
310 DUKE LAW JO URNAL [Vol. 46:291
[The] RFRA itself forthrightly declares that its purpose is to restore the com-
pelling interest test as the rule of decision in cases implicating the First Amend-
ment. . . . [The] RFRA violates the constitutional separation of powers by
requiring the courts to employ a standard of judicial review for First Amend-
ment cases which has been expressly rejected by the Supreme Court .... This
[court] is aware of no other statute by which Congress resurrected a judicially-
rejected standard of judicial review for an entire class of constitutional cases.
Id. at 598-604. By the substantive terms of the RFRA, in Judge Smalkin's view, courts
are thus instructed to disregard the Court's view of the First Amendment and to apply
Congress' view instead (i.e., the view it enacted in the RFRA). And, in this sense, the
observations of Gressman, Carmella, Eisgruber, and Sager, see supra note 44, are also
quite right. Paul Brest presciently anticipated just this kind of act a full decade ago. See
Brest, supra note 32, at 76 ("What are the possible consequences if Congress does at-
tempt to contradict judicial doctrine? First, the Court might simply defer to Congress'
interpretation; this would, of course, require overruling or at least significantly modifying
Marbury.") (footnote omitted).
By his reference to an "entire class of constitutional cases," see Keeler, 928 F.
Supp. at 604, Judge Smalkin also distinguished, quite appropriately, the reach of the rea-
soning in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966). The reasoning (such as it is) sus-
taining the Morgan statute is readily distinguishable. Judge Smalkin's observation was that
in cases of the Morgan genus, Congress relied on a "specially informed legislative compe-
tence"--not competence with respect to the "proper meaning" of the constitutional provi-
sion in question, but rather a "special competence" (such as it may be) to examine spe-
cific problematic areas. Keeler, 928 F. Supp. at 602-03 (quoting Morgan, 384 U.S. at 656).
According to this paradigm, Congress would (a) take a hard look into a particular subject
(e.g., literacy tests, race, and voting rights); (b) take a measure of the area as it deems
warranted (e.g., review where such tests are given, how they tend to be applied, the
extent to which they may lend themselves to improper application, the extent to which
that has in fact occurred, etc.); (c) measure the adequacy of current means to address the
problem(s); and, when Congress deems it appropriate to do so, (d) propose by statute a
suitable additional measure convincing to Congress as a necessary and proper one-a
statute to be respected insofar as courts can see a "reasonable basis" for it, given
Congress' findings, such as they are. Legitimate Morgan cases, such as they are, are of
this retail kind. See, eg., City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 176-77 (1980);
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 476-78 (1980). Even the statute at issue in Oregon v.
Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), retained more (though not enough) of this character than
anything akin to the RFRA. See Brest, supra note 32, at 72-78.
To model another act of Congress so as to more nearly resemble the RFRA, in
the very sense that Judge Smalkin had in mind (in correctly concluding that the RFRA
dictates the substance of judicial review in all cases colorably asserting a Free Exercise
claim), one would need an act declaring nothing in reference to any specific "problem-
area" of equal protection cases. It would be an act simply declaring a very strong view
of what the Equal Protection Clause forbids-for example, an act providing that: "No act
or action of any kind by any state or local govemment substantially more burdensome to
some persons within the jurisdiction of the state than to other persons within the same
state, shall be adopted or applied by any state." The statute, if it were truly akin to the
RFRA in both purpose and effect, would further declare that: "It is the express purpose
of this act to make it of no legal consequence (and thus no defense to the state) that
nothing the state has done or failed to do is inconsistent with any provision in the Four-
teenth Amendment merely according to the Supreme Court."
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means (and declares that it means) to make the alleged "right" of
the complaining party carry more by way of entitlement than the
Court has declared the Constitution provides. It does not put too
fine a point on the matter to say that the RFRA is meant to
make the lack of a meritorious First Amendment claim (an
"unmeritorious" claim, in the Supreme Court's view) utterly irrele-
vant.51
The RFRA thus presupposes that the courts will reject the
First Amendment claim or defense as "without merit" so long as
Smith remains intact.52 (Indeed, it is only in such a circumstance
that the RFRA has any work of its own.) Yet for all that (and
herein is the anomaly), it purports still to be an act providing for
the mere "enforcement" of the First Amendment 5 -- even while
seeking to make the Court's view of the First Amendment irrele-
vant insofar as the Court's view (of what the amendment does and
Moreover, contrary to Judge Posner's suggestion in Sasnett v. Sullivan, it is plainly
not the design of the RFRA merely "to make the formal right of religious freedom of
persons who lack political power in individual states.., a meaningful right." 91 F.3d
1018, 1021-22 (7th Cir. 1996). Rather, it is (as Judge Posner conceded elsewhere in the
same opinion, see id. at 1020-21) the express design of the RFRA-a design it presumes
exactly to fulfill-to assert that Congress' view, not the Supreme Court's view, of what
varieties of state laws shall not be deemed consistent with the First Amendment shall
control-indeed that religious exemption entitlements shall generally be furnished in every
state, across the board, under every law, absent some sufficient excuse the state must be
prepared to prove by the standards Congress presumed to reenact in the RFRA.
51. Which is precisely what the Act does. See, e.g., cases and discussion supra notes
47 and 50; see also Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468, 475 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding likelihood
of success on the merits in Rastafarian inmate's RFRA challenge to "medical keeplock"
(confinement) for failure to submit to tuberculosis test; the court did not evaluate his
First Amendment free exercise claim, but did note its lesser standard); Hicks v. Garner,
69 F.3d 22, 25-26 (5th Cir. 1995) (permitting Rastafarian inmate to proceed with RFRA,
but not First Amendment free exercise, challenge to prison hair length and beard regula-
tions).
52. In this respect, moreover, it is very much like the statute involved in Klein. See
supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text. In that instance, too, Congress presupposed
that without its instruction respecting the judicial use to be made of the pardon Klein
relied upon, the Court was likely to treat that pardon exactly in the manner Klein pro-
posed. Congress sought to "veto" that presumed treatment, by its directive to the Court.
See id.
53. Or, rather, the "enforcement" of the Fourteenth Amendment--specifically, the
"liberty due process" feature that is deemed to apply the First Amendment Free Exercise
Clause co-equally to the states. See, eg., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04
(1940). The RFRA's theory is that Congress can make water run uphill, by finding
"rights" in the Fourteenth Amendment (namely, special entitlements to exemptions from
laws of general application) notwithstanding the Supreme Court's view that no rights of
this exceptional sort are encompassed by the First Amendment.
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does not prohibit) may be inconsistent with its own.' In turn,
that the RFRA "just happens" to select the standards it directs all
courts to apply from previous (but now discarded) views of the
Supreme Court (views the Court once thought, but no longer
thinks, appropriate as a matter of First Amendment law)-rather
than from some other source-is made irrelevant under the Act.
The Act enacts what it enacts. But it is not irrelevant under the
Constitution insofar as the question under the Constitution is where
Congress got the authority to substitute these standards, such that
they now become "the supreme law of the land."
We know what Congress claims. On the face of the RFRA
itself, Congress claims a power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to pick and choose among various Supreme Court
justices and from various past opinions respecting the extent to
which states are or are not limited by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. And it claims that Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment empowers it to elevate a dissent's view into supreme
law, by statute, when Congress adds its votes to those of the dis-
54. See supra notes 19, 47, 50, and 51 and accompanying text. It is just this uniquely
sweeping and aggressive feature of the Act that has, quite understandably, led observers
such as Brest, Eisgruber, Sager, Gressman, and Carmella, see supra notes 32 and 44, to
see it as an attack on Marbury v. Madison-that is, insofar as it claims a power in Con-
gress to set aside constitutional interpretations by the courts when such interpretations
are not acceptable to Congress. And in that sense, they are quite right. See RFRA
§ 2000bb(b)(1) (reporting that the purpose of the Act is to make the view of the Su-
preme Court respecting what the First Amendment does and does not do as, hereafter,
to count for nothing insofar as it differs from Congress' view). That this is the intended
effect is quite clear. See Laycock & Thomas, supra note 19, at 219 (quite unembarrass-
edly describing the RFRA as meant to be "a replacement for the Free Exercise Clause"
and, as a replacement, "as universal as the Free Exercise Clause") (emphasis added). An
act that is a "replacement" for a provision in the Constitution (and "as universal" as the
provision it "replaces"), however, can hardly be described in the same breath as merely
an "enforcement" of the very thing it replaces, or so one may quite properly-perhaps
even tartly--suggest. And there can be no doubt that the Act was intended as that re-
placement.
The Act thus does not stand merely on a claim that it is simply an appropriate
measure to prevent otherwise-difficuit-to-prove violations of the First or Fourteenth
Amendment. Cf. Laycock, supra note 19, at 146; Sasnett v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1018, 1019
(7th Cir. 1996); Flores v. City of Boeme, Tex., 73 F.3d 1352, 1361 (5th Cir.), cert. grant-
ed, 117 S. Ct. 293 (Oct. 15, 1996) (No. 95-2074). It stands, rather, on a blunt claim of
authority in Congress to legislate an interpretation of the First (and Fourteenth)
Amendment, an interpretation that Congress prefers to the Supreme Court's, and authori-
ty to require that interpretation to be applied in all courts and with respect to all free
exercise cases.
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senting justices55 and thus empowers it to determine how the
states are to be governed. 6
But if, indeed, Congress has this special power, there is little
reason to think that it must find the standards it enacts in even
some past (discarded) or some current (dissenting) opinion of the
Supreme Court, rather than, say, finding them in some well-written
article by Douglas Laycock,1 or in a column by George Will or
55. Compare the following version of the RFRA:
In any case where the free exercise claim would fail under the First Amend-
ment according to the majority in Smith, but not fail under the First Amend-
ment according to the dissent in Smith, the court shall-according to our in-
struction-decide the case before it in the manner directed by the dissent in
Smith, namely, in the following manner [etc.].
In what way, if any, does this differ from the RFRA? Not at all. Indeed, Congress did
enact this statute, merely rephrased-this is the RFRA.
56. Although, note, not how Congress itself is to be governed. For the RFRA pro-
vides an exemption from its own provisions for any act of Congress that expressly ex-
empts itself (§ 2000bb-3(b) of the Act so provides), no such privilege, however, being
available by the terms of the Act to any state. This feature of the RFRA is merely
further indicative of its anomalous and spurious claims. On the one hand, the statute
purports to do no more than "enforce" a clause (the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment) made merely as binding on the states by force of the Fourteenth
Amendment as it is already on Congress. On the other hand, the statute expressly pro-
vides that Congress may pass legislation and provide that the legislation applies uniformly
and unexceptionally to all persons (i.e., may exempt itself from the strictures of the
RFRA)--such that no court may deem the legislation inapplicable merely because it
happens to burden certain religious practices, whether or not it serves any compelling
interest. At the same time, of course, Congress makes no claim at all that it can thereby
also exempt itself from the Free Exercise Clause as interpreted, understood, and applied
by the Supreme Court.
So, for example, Congress may enact any drug control laws it thinks suitable
(merely pursuant to the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause), declare
the RFRA inapplicable for such reasons as are satisfactory to itself, and count on courts
never to subject the law to the standards of the RFRA (which are not, therefore, First
Amendment standards after all)--with complete and correct confidence that the law will
not be deemed to offend the First Amendment so long as it meets the standards of
Smith and so long as Smith itself commands a majority in the Supreme Court. But Con-
gress presumes to maintain that no state law, however neutral (i.e., no matter how simi-
lar to its own) could be equally valid, no matter how well it likewise complies with
Smith. For, again, so far as the states are concerned, Congress has declared that the
Court's view of the First Amendment is not controlling, rather, its own view, "re-enact-
ing" the Sherbert-Yoder test, shall be the First Amendment governing the states-albeit
not equally governing itself to the extent it chooses not to be so governed. The coy
provisions of the RFRA-with its express, carefully built-in, self-exemption clause-merely
further expose the straw of its own construction. It is as if Section 5 empowered Con-
gress to enforce a version of the First Amendment to which the states must do homage,
though Congress itself need pay no similar homage except just so far as it feels inclined.
57. See Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. Cr. REv. 1; see
also Brant, supra note 46, at 7. Brant states:
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Art Buchwald." The source of Congress' inspiration is really of
little moment, for nothing turns on it: the challenge, in the sense
of which Justice Jackson wrote in Brown v. Allen,59 is the same.
Was Congress, in a word, ever put in charge of "overruling" the
Supreme Court, and given power to "reverse' 6 the Court's deci-
sions, expediently legislating a dissenting opinion into "law" there-
after to govern, until such time as Congress might experience
some change of mind?61 It seems seriously doubtful that this can
be so. 6' Rather, a more nearly accurate description respecting
Congress' enforcement authority in respect to the prohibitory
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment is very likely this:
When recognized state violations of federal constitutional stan-
dards have occurred, Congress is of course empowered by § 5 to
take appropriate remedial measures to redress and prevent the
wrongs. But it is a judicial question whether the condition with
which Congress has thus sought to deal is in truth an in-
fringement of the Constitution, something that is the necessary
prerequisite to bringing the § 5 power into play at all.6'
The new House Bill 2797 [which eventually became the RFRA] contained a
section entitled "Congressional Findings and Declaration of Purposes," consisting
of five findings of fact and two definitive statements of purpose [retained in
final version of the RFRA]. No basis for these factual findings appears in the
legislative record. Rather, they appear to be drawn from the remarks of one
senator and an academic witness [Laycock] who submitted several letters and
testified in support of the Act.
Id. (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
58. Indeed, Congress might just as readily have gotten its standards from something
that Art Buchwald, George Will, or William Safire sparked off, in a merely complaining
or humorous (or merely mischievous) column on "What Ought to Be Given to Religious
People (Though Not Equally to Anyone Else) By Way of Exemption from Otherwise
Valid Laws." In a straightforward understanding of its provisions, of course, this is not
merely what the RFRA means to do; rather, Congress meant to dictate what the Four-
teenth Amendment shall be deemed to require and what all states must therefore
do-whether otherwise inclined or not, and though the Supreme Court has declared this
is not required by any provision in the Constitution.
59. See supra text accompanying note 2 ("if there were a super-Supreme
Court. . . .") (emphasis added).
60. See supra text accompanying note 3 (President Clinton's statement at the signing
of the RFRA) ("[T]his act reverses the Supreme Court's decision . . ").
61. That is, until a later Congress decides that perhaps the majority in Smith actually
got the matter right, after all, and so "enacts" that view into law instead. (Congress'
view of its authority pursuant to Section 5 implicitly claims authority to "overrule" itself,
of course, as well as to "overrule" the Supreme Court.)
62. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
63. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 666 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted). Justice Rehnquist made a similar point in his dissent in City of Rome v. United
States:
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The polar opposite position, on this quintessential separation-
of-powers question, is laid bare in the view offered by Professor
William Cohen. It is that whatever the state would be free to do
to relax its law, Congress can do "for it" instead. That is, Congress
may impose such rules to limit the states as Congress thinks best,
and go as far as the most permissive state could, as a simple do-
mestic policy choice.'
The Cohen position, however, ultimately frankly detaches
itself from any effective pretense of having any real connection at
all with Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. In fact, it stands
or falls on the utter abandonment of federalism review by the
Supreme Court.6' It is wholly of a commonplace piece with the
Wechsler-Choper federalism thesis, effectively declaring that the
courts should simply take the view that the Constitution leaves it
to Congress to determine the extent to which the states retain any
authority to legislate in any way Congress may or may not wish
them to, regardless of subject matter.66 The Cohen thesis also
If the enforcement power is construed as a "remedial" grant of authority, it is
this Court's duty to ensure that a challenged congressional Act does no more
than "enforce" the limitations on state power established in the Fourteenth...
Amendment[]. Marbury v. Madison.
[I]n order to invoke a remedy, there must be a wrong-and under a reme-
dial construction of congressional power to enforce the Fourteenth . . . Amend-
mentol, that wrong must amount to a constitutional violation. Only when the
wrong is identified can the appropriateness of the remedy be measured.
446 U.S. 156, 211, 213 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (citation omit-
ted).
64. See William Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret Due Process and Equal Pro-
tection, 27 STAN. L. REV. 603, 614 (1975). Cohen writes:
[A] congressional judgment resolving at the national level an issue that
could-without constitutional objection-be decided in the same way at the state
level, ought normally to be binding on the courts, since Congress presumably
reflects a balance between both national and state interests and hence is better
able to adjust such conflicts.
Id.; see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-14, at 347-48
(2d ed. 1988) (summarizing this position).
65. Professor Cohen candidly conceded (in attempting to make some broad categori-
cal sense of Katzenbach v. Morgan as he tried, conscientiously, to do) that his position is
also inconsistent with the Court's decision in Oregon v. Mitchell. See Cohen, supra note
64, at 616-17 ("One difficulty with the liberty-federalism theory is that it will not distin-
guish . . . Katzenbach v. Morgan and Oregon v. Mitchell.")
66. The notion, in sum, is that the states were never to receive any judicial protec-
tion under the Constitution (i.e., protection through the courts)-that they were solely to
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breaks with rationalizing the act of Congress as a mere "enforce-
ment" of some constitutional limitation imposed on the states. A
simple example should make this plain. We return to the state ob-
scenity law once again.
A state may criminalize obscenity, as we have previously
noted, but of course it need not do so. Having once done so,
moreover, it may later decide to repeal its anti-obscenity law. It
may do so, to be sure, on account of a requirement in its own
state constitution "free speech" clause-or it may do so from a
belief that either the letter or spirit of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments would be more faithfully carried into effect by doing
so. But let us suppose that it reaches neither of these conclusions;
let us suppose instead that it repeals its anti-obscenity law from no
more a sublime (nor less excellent) reason than it might have in
similarly deciding to repeal some of its criminal drug laws, namely,
the conclusion that these laws simply tend to do more harm than
good, that they spawn a heavy criminalized traffic (in drugs, or in
obscene materials), that they stimulate criminal activities in much
the same way that Prohibition did, and that it is simply time to
take a different approach altogether (even as many believe to be
warranted in respect to criminalized drugs).
In brief, from the state's view, the matter (as we are here
stipulating it to be) is no different in constitutional terms than the
state's decision to decriminalize commercial transactions in liquor
and other alcoholic beverages. The state is perfectly aware that the
Twenty-First Amendment permits it to be a "dry" state and, with
that understanding, neither does it believe that there is any "fun-
damental right" of people to imbibe alcohol. Its decriminalization
receive such "protection" as the "built-in structural provisions" of the Constitution might
offer (namely, protection at the pleasure of Congress, whatever it might be). This is the
Wechsler-Choper thesis writ large. See JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE
NATIONAL POLTICAL PROCESS 175-76 (1980); Jesse H. Choper, The Scope of National
Power Vis--Vis the States: The Dispensability of Judicial Review, 86 YALE L.J. 1552, 1557
(1977); Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States
in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543,
558-60 (1954); see also James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine
of Constitutional Law, 7 HARv. L. REV. 129, 130-44 (1893) (reviewing the origins of the
power of courts to invalidate legislative acts, and advocating a highly deferential review).
Professor Cohen also relied on Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971), to suggest
that the thesis had been essentially accepted by the Supreme Court. See Cohen, supra
note 64, at 613 n.49. Understandably, he failed to anticipate that the Court might not
agree. It does not. See, eg., United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995); New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
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of alcohol consumption, or of marijuana consumption,
or-indeed-of obscenity consumption, is not and need not be
driven by anything so sublime as some notion of constitutional
entitlements, or any special desire to extend "liberty" as such.
Rather, the state is driven by the practical conclusion that the
current regime creates negative externalities that the state desires
to avoid-which it then does, by taking a more relaxed, less regu-
latory, less draconian view. And all of this is perfectly sensible for
the state to do.
Under the Cohen thesis, however, insofar as there is no con-
stitutional barrier on the state's relaxation or outright abandon-
ment of any of these .laws (and surely there is none), Congress
could itself evidently step in and could sweep all the same state
laws aside-at least with (and maybe even without?) pretense of
doing so as an exercise of authority under Section 5 to enforce the
"Liberty" Clause of Section 1. For, under the Cohen view (as a
mere implementation of the Thayer-extended-by-Wechsler-extend-
ed-by-Choper view 1), the Supreme Court appropriately abrogates
federalism review in favor of Congress."
Indeed, it is just this, too, that is also at stake, even as it was
in earlier cases, as Justice Harlan, Alexander Bickel, and others
have recognized all along.69 And it is also why the Court's own
recent "federalism" decisions, New York v. United States,7° United
States v. Lopez,7 and Seminole Tribe v. Forida,72 are significant
as well. And so, too, as Bickel believed, are Marbury v. Madi-
son73 and McCulloch v. Maryland4 involved, respecting the role
67. See supra note 66.
68. But see supra note 20 and accompanying text (noting the express rejection of
such a proposal).
69. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 666 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (ex-
cerpted supra at text accompanying note 63); Bickel, The Voting Rights Cases, supra note
20, at 95-102; supra notes 20, 50, and 54.
70. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
71. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
72. 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996).
73. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
74. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 423 (1819). In McCulloch, Chief Justice Marshall wrote:
[S]hould Congress, under the pretext of executing its powers, pass laws for the
accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the [national] government ... it
would become the painful duty of this tribunal, should a case requiring such a
decision come before it, to say that such an act was not the law of the land.
Iii; see also 1 ALBERT J. BEvEIDGE, THm LIFE OF JoHN MARSHALL 452 (1919) (re-
marks of John Marshall during the Virginia ratification debates) ("If . . . [Congress] were
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of the Court in keeping Congress within the boundary of its enu-
merated powers-in this instance, the power to "enforce" the pro-
visions of the Fourteenth Amendment. 5
C.
In his influential treatise, Professor Tribe presents two other
views' and concludes strongly on a different view still:
It is not difficult to reconcile congressional power to define the
content of fourteenth amendment rights with Marbury v. Madison
and judicial review. Judicial review does not require that the
Constitution always be equated with the Supreme Court's view of
it. It is the Court's responsibility, under Marbury, to strike down
acts of Congress which the Court concludes to be unconstitution-
al-nothing more.n
Of course, this is all true-artfully couched as it is with the appro-
priate (but merely nominal) nod to judicial review in its conclud-
ing observation. But it also quite begs the question (or, rather,
asserts a premise that proves too much and is false). It is the
Court's responsibility to strike down acts of Congress for which
Congress can provide no authority to have enacted its will; this
much Professor Tribe concedes." The question comes around
then, still again: pursuant to what authority was this act adopted?
What "provision" in the Fourteenth Amendment does the RFRA
"enforce"? It is given this power, not some other; there is no
power given to Congress "to define" the content of the Fourteenth
Amendment however it may like.
Congress is given power to "define the content" of certain
things, to be sure-for example, the power to determine the "con-
tent" of the rules by which it operates.79 Such provisions are
to make a law not warranted by any of the powers enumerated, it would be considered
by the [National] judges as an infringement of the Constitution which they are to guard.
They would not consider such a law as coming under their jurisdiction. They would de-
clare it void.").
75. See Bickel, The Voting Rights Cases, supra note 20, at 97-98.
76. See TRiBE, supra note 64, § 5-14, at 345-48 (outlining a total of four approaches
to Justice Brennan's opinion in Katzenbach v. Morgan).
77. Id. § 5-14, at 349 (footnote omitted); see also Robin-Vergeer, supra note 45, at
765 (citing the above passage from Tribe in her defense of the RFRA's constitutionality).
78. See TRIE, supra note 64, § 5-2, at 298-300.
79. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 ("Each House may determine the Rules of its
Proceedings.").
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twice instructive. They stand in contrast, not in parity, with the
Fourteenth Amendment. They well indicate that Congress itself
knows the difference. A mere rephrasing of Section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment, so to provide just such a power in Con-
gress-"to define the content of rights provided in Section 1"-is
enough to make clear how utterly different it would look. And it
makes clear how utterly implausible it is to suppose that any pro-
vision as thus proposed would-in 1868 or now-be ratified by the
requisite number of states.8"
In Marbury itself, note it could perfectly well be said that
Congress was merely "enforcing" (if now translated as "defining
the content of") a provision in Article III-namely, the provision
that sketches the judicial power and then vests it in one Supreme
Court and such inferior courts as Congress may provide.8 ' In
vesting the judicial power in the Supreme Court, Article MI goes
on to vest it in that Court partly as a matter of original jurisdic-
tion (two kinds of cases are specified), and partly as a matter of
appellate jurisdiction, then authorizing Congress to place within
the court's original jurisdiction some additional cases it deems
appropriate to so place, excepting them from its appellate jurisdic-
tion, where they would otherwise have remained. Or so at least
one could readily read Article III; such a reading would not be, in
any obvious way, "unreasonable."' And if all that is required is
that the Court be able to see "a reasonable basis" for the reading
(i.e., the interpretation or the rendering) Congress provided,83
then in Marbury itself, the Court should have sustained the Judi-
ciary Act provision that did precisely this very thing (though in its
own view that reading of Article III was incorrect). As we know,
however, the Court inquired into the constitutional interpretation
on which the Judiciary Act depended for its validity; it took
80. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (noticing the rejection in Congress of a
proposed draft of the Fourteenth Amendment that, even in its rejected terms, did not
presume to confer this kind of power on Congress).
81. See U.S. CONsT. art. In, § 1.
82. Such a reading of Article III is eminently plausible, though not the only reading,
to be sure. Any court could perceive "a reasonable basis" so to understand Article III in
just this way. See William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison,
1969 DUKE L.. 1, 30-33.
83. Compare Justice Brennan's formulation for the majority in Katzenbach v. Mor-
gan, 384 U.S. 641, 653 (1966) (stating that it is not for the Supreme Court to review
§ 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 beyond determining "a basis upon which the
Congress might resolve the conflict [between federal and state interests] as it did").
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Congress' view into account (always an appropriate matter to be
sure); it disagreed with that interpretation (such as it was, as made
by Congress); and it accordingly found that Congress had acted
without authority (i.e., had acted in excess of any enumerated
power) in providing as it had attempted to do.
In a larger sense, of course, the view that the Court should
accept any "constitutional interpretation" of a clause that serves as
a necessary predicate for some act of Congress whenever the Court
can see "a reasonable basis" for that interpretation by Congress
would at once virtually put an end to most of what makes the
Supreme Court of the United States important-indeed, put an
end to most of the institution of judicial review itself. For unless
one can see at least a reasonable basis for a claim that some act
or action by a state is contrary to some provision in the Constitu-
tion, the claim is unlikely to advance very far in the first place,
much less advance to the Supreme Court.
To put the matter differently, it may correctly be said that we
hardly need a Supreme Court just to rule on manifestly frivolous
questions of constitutional law; rather, it is precisely in circum-
stances where "reasonable" people may (and do) differ that the
unique resolving agency of the Supreme Court-to provide finality
as well as stability-is most salient and most relevantly called upon
to decide the matter. s4
84. The point was put perfectly well by Justice Jackson, a half century ago, in the
excerpted quotation prefacing this Essay. It is appropriate to repeat it here:
The generalities of the Fourteenth Amendment are so indeterminate as to what
state actions are forbidden that this Court has found it a ready instrument, in
one field or another, to magnify federal, and incidentally its ov.n, authority over
the states .... There is no doubt that if there were a super-Supreme Court, a
substantial proportion of our [decisions respecting what the states may or may
not do consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment] would also be reversed. We
are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we
are final.
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 534, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring). Obviously,
Congress' ambition here is to deny that proposition, to declare that the Court is not "fi-
nal" when it comes to saying what the states may not be permitted to do under the
Fourteenth Amendment; rather, Congress is. And its ambition is to declare that if the
Court will not read the "generalities" of the Fourteenth Amendment in a way satisfactory
to "magnify" federal authority over the states, Congress will "reverse" the Court's deci-
sions and so, as a super-Supreme Court, presume suitably to magnify that authority for
itself.
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Then, too, there is Professor Robin-Vergeer's seductive re-
phrasing in her own conclusion (as an incident of which she quotes
from Tribe), namely that:
Under settled case law and the best understanding of its role on
the constitutional stage, Congress has the power to enact legis-
lation augmenting fundamental constitutional values beyond the
level of protection the Supreme Court would require as a matter
of constitutional law and displacing conflicting state laws, regard-
less of whether the federal legislation seemingly "contradicts" the
narrower Supreme Court precedent.'
This, too, however, is essentially a mere figleaf of felicitous lan-
guage (about "augmenting constitutional values") to make the
RFRA go down with a spoonful of rhetorical sugar. The dead
giveaway is discoverable in Professor Robin-Vergeer's use of the
word "seemingly"-as though the matter were not one of any real
difference at all. But that is plainly false. There is nothing merely
"seemingly" contradictory here. The suggestion that perhaps "Su-
preme Court precedent" and the provisions of the RFRA are only
seemingly at odds, but actually fully reconcilable, is belied on the
face of the Act and in the President's own description of both its
purpose and its intended effect.8 6
But, here, too, let us try it out in text; let us provisionally
rewrite Section 5 straightforwardly, to say, for example:
The Congress shall have power to enforce its view of this article
by appropriate legislation.
85. Robin-Vergeer, supra note 45, at 764 (emphasis added).
86. See Appendix (reproducing full text of the RFRA); supra text accompanying note
3 (President Clinton's statement that the RFRA "reverses" Employment Discrimination v.
Smith); see also Flores v. City of Boeme, 73 F.3d 1352, 1361 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. grant-
ed, 117 S. Ct. 293 (Oct. 15, 1996) (No. 95-2074) (describing the RFRA as "a substantive
expansion" and "an assignment by Congress of a higher value to free-exercise-secured
freedoms than the value assigned by the courts") (emphasis added).
Moreover, there is also in Professor Robin-Vergeer's formulation another question
also too smoothly glossed over, namely, just what the "values" thus "augmented" are.
These "values" may be merely in the beholder's own eye. What one person sees as the
appropriate "accommodation" of "religious needs" by civil authority, others may equally
well see (and be quite as correct in doing so) as the mere special privileging of those no
more burdened by laws than anyone else, yet expecting and receiving privileged treat-
ment. Which "values," then, does the RFRA "augment"?
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Or, if this seems somehow too strong, playing false to the more
modest claim, then put it this way:
The Congress shall have power to enact legislation augmenting
constitutional values it imputes to this article, and have such
values as thus "augmented" by act of Congress applied as su-
preme law to regulate and to limit the states. 7
If Section 5 read this way, even the first way, or if Section 5 were
even meant to be understood in this way (though it does not say
so), one might agree that the RFRA might be valid.18 It does not
read this way, however, nor does it even suggest the thought. And
again, if it did, if one encountered it for the first time as a seri-
ously proposed amendment, one would surely raise some critical
and serious questions, would one not?
E.
Still, to be sure, one can admit the Court itself may neverthe-
less interpolate such language (or invent such an "understanding")
into the clause if it wishes; just as it may accept for itself a subor-
dinate or even a sycophant role to Congress,89 and further aban-
don federalism review.9" It may do so, that is, despite the firm
evidence that it was just this sort of substantive constitutional
review (i.e., federalism review) that was most expected of the Su-
preme Court. It is-it was even9' in Morgan itself-largely a con-
87. (Though not to limit itself, except to such extent as Congress shall itself decide.
See supra note 56 for a review of this self-exempting feature of the RFRA.)
88. However, one says "might" (rather than "would") advisedly, because, of course,
the RFRA does not necessarily rest on any actual view of Congress regarding the Four-
teenth Amendment or of any of its provisions at all. It may rest, rather, merely on what
Congress preferred from an enthusiasm of its own: to preferentially befriend "religion,"
moved merely, as Congress so often appears to be moved, by the most ordinary and
usual politics of the day and nothing more sublime. There is nothing to suggest that
Congress even inquired into the particular provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment in
fashioning the RFRA.
89. which, unquestionably, sustaining the RFRA would clearly signal-for the Act
makes no bones about its claim of entitlement to set aside the finality of Supreme Court
adjudications of constitutional clauses, asserting an entitlement to substitute its own.
90. In some measure, no doubt, the Court has already done this, moreover, begin-
ning with Katzenbach v. Morgan-although never in the sweeping manner and never to
the degree so subordinating of the Court as that reflected in the RFRA. See Katzenbach
v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 648 (1966).
91. And one says "even" advisedly; the act of Congress involved in Morgan did not
involve nearly the breadth of Congress' claim as now asserted in the RFRA. See supra
notes 50-62 and accompanying text.
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stitutional tour de force scarcely anyone on the Court other than
Justice Harlan found troubling.92 It was merely consistent with
Justice Brennan's and others' general disposition to denigrate fed-
eralism review.93
This view of Section 5, permitting Congress to "reverse" the
Court's Fourteenth Amendment decisions, however, was quite ade-
quately disposed of by Bickel himself, in his review of Morgan,
three decades ago.94 "Nothing is clearer about the history of the
Fourteenth Amendment," he wrote, "than that its framers rejected
the option of an open-ended grant of power to Congress to med-
dle with conditions within the states so as to render them equal in
accordance with its own notions." Rather, he noted, "the framers
chose to write an amendment empowering Congress only to rectify
inequalities put into effect by the states. Hence the power of Con-
gress comes into play only when the precondition of a denial of
equal protection of the laws by a state has been met.,
95
Bickel frankly expressed surprise at the Court's "abdication"
of its proper judicial function even in the lesser degree reflected in
Morgan itself. Still, at the time, he managed to conclude on a
suitably professional and cautious note. "One doubts," he wrote,
"that a new trend has really been inaugurated."96 Three decades
later, the Court having quite carelessly offered Congress encour-
agement to deem itself nearly unlimited in constitutional authority,
it seems clear that some kind of trend was inaugurated. And so
the question now, as the RFRA wends its way through the federal
court system, is whether it has any end.
92. See Morgan, 384 U.S. at 666 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (excerpted supra at text
accompanying note 63).
93. See, eg., Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 856 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528
(1985). This disposition is shared even now, perhaps, by four members of the current
Court. See, e.g., the dissenting opinions in United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995),
and New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
94. See Bickel, The Voting Rights Cases, supra note 20, at 95-102.
95. Id. at 97.
96. Id. at 102.
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APPENDIX
THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACr
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994)
§ 2000bb. Congressional findings and declaration of purposes
(a) Findings
The Congress finds that-
(1) the framers of the Constitution, recognizing free exer-
cise of religion as an unalienable right, secured its protection
in the First Amendment to the Constitution;
(2) laws "neutral" toward religion may burden religious
exercise as surely as laws intended to interfere with religious
exercise;
(3) governments should not substantially burden religious
exercise without compelling justification;
(4) in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)
the Supreme Court virtually eliminated the requirement that
the government justify burdens on religious exercise imposed
by laws neutral toward religion; and
(5) the compelling interest test as set forth in prior Feder-
al court rulings is a workable test for striking sensible balanc-
es between religious liberty and competing prior governmental
interests.
(b) Purposes
The purposes of this chapter are-
(1) to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and to guarantee its application in
all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially bur-
dened; and
(2) to provide a claim or defense to persons whose reli-
gious exercise is substantially burdened by government.
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§ 2000bb-1. Free exercise of religion protected
(a) In general
Government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise
of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general appli-
cability, except as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
(b) Exception
Government may substantially burden a person's exercise of
religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to
the person-
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental inter-
est; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that com-
pelling governmental interest.
(c) Judicial relief
A person whose religious exercise has been burdened in viola-
tion of this section may assert that violation as a claim or defense
in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a
government. Standing to assert a claim or defense under this sec-
tion shall be governed by the general rules of standing under
article III of the Constitution.
§ 2000bb-2. Definitions
As used in this chapter-
(1) the term "government" includes a branch, department,
agency, instrumentality, and official (or other person acting
under color of law) of the United States, a State, or a sub-
division of a State;
(2) the term "State" includes the District of Columbia,
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and each territory and
possession of the United States;
(3) the term "demonstrates" means meets the burdens of
going forward with the evidence and of persuasion; and
(4) the term "exercise of religion" means the exercise of
religion under the First Amendment to the Constitution.
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§ 2000bb-3. Applicability
(a) In general
This chapter applies to all Federal and State law, and the
implementation of that law, whether statutory or otherwise, and
whether adopted before or after November 16, 1993.
(b) Rule of construction
Federal statutory law adopted after November 16, 1993, is
subject to this chapter unless such law explicitly excludes such
application by reference to this chapter.
(c) Religious belief unaffected
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to authorize any
government to burden any religious belief.
§ 2000bb-4. Establishment clause unaffected
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to affect, interpret,
or in any way address that portion of the First Amendment pro-
hibiting laws respecting the establishment of religion (referred to
in this section as the "Establishment Clause"). Granting govern-
ment funding, benefits, or exemptions, to the extent permissible
under the Establishment Clause, shall not constitute a violation of
this chapter. As used in this section, the term "granting", used
with respect to government funding, benefits, or exemptions, does
not include the denial of government funding, benefits, or exemp-
tions.
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